Neo-liberal Governing of “Radicals”: Danish Radicalization Prevention Policies and Potential Iatrogenic Effects

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The Danish government’s counter-radicalization Action Plan of 2009 had intended and unintended effects. Primarily targeting Danish Muslims, it employs neo-liberal governmentality approaches of governance through individual support and response, information and knowledge, empowerment, surveillance and intervention, and anti-discrimination. It aims to prevent radicalization by transforming, shaping, and disciplining illiberal and violence-prone “radicals” into active, liberal citizens. Prolonged fieldwork and in-depth interviews with seventeen Muslims from a targeted milieu reveal skepticism about the effectiveness of the measures. Implementation of the action plan in practice may yield iatrogenic effects.

The concept of radicalization has become a central part of the political and academic vocabulary, especially in recent articulation and analysis of the threat from Islamist terrorism. The concept has, in particular, been linked to the question of “home-grown terrorism” in the West. Radicalization has become the main frame for understanding, explaining, and preventing young Muslims from engaging in radical activities. Although the concept is contested, the discourse of radicalization and theories of radicalization processes are gaining momentum in most European countries (Sedgwick 2010).

The popularity of the radicalization discourse is largely a product of the reconsideration of existing counter-terrorism policies aimed at stopping terrorist attacks, especially following the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 and 2005. These attacks refocused attention among policymakers, security agencies, and academics from “external security” to “internal security” (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008), launching the concept of radicalization as the framework for understanding “home-grown terrorism”. In this new perspective, concern is increasingly directed toward issues of integration, parallel communities, and illiberal attitudes of Muslim minorities in particular, as their lack of integration, social cohesion, and experience of marginalization are posited to provide a breeding ground for radicalization.

It is against this backdrop that radicalization prevention has developed as a new policy area in many European countries over the past five or six years. It is characteristic of the radicalization discourse, and of the new policy regimes, that they mix a security agenda with an integration agenda, where security concerns and risk assessment become closely intertwined with questions of integration, anti-discrimination, and social cohesion.

The discourse on radicalization has roots in security concerns, but also concerns the wider debate on how Western liberal democracies should relate to, and integrate, especially Muslim minorities. Christian Joppke identifies a development towards “repressive liberalism” within the fields of integration and immigration policy (2007), where Western European states are increasingly concerned with forming and letting in the right kind of liberal-democratic oriented people, creating as he puts it “liberal states for liberal people only” (Joppke 2007, 271). Joppke sees this trend as exemplifying the flourishing of a Foucauldian disciplining form of neo-liberalism. He connects his thesis about the advance of repressive liberalism with the Foucauldian concept of gov-
ernmentality, which constitutes a form of regulation that aims at “shaping behavior in congruence with particular sets of norms and with a certain goal” (Dean 1999, 15). Governmentality as a mode of regulation is characterized by the ambition to govern through individuals’ exercise of free choice, rather than direct control or prohibitions.

In the following I refer to the Danish government’s action plan of January 2009 for radicalization prevention – *A Common and Safe Future* – as an exemplary case of the formation of radicalization prevention as a new policy field and practice regime (Regeringen 2009). The purpose of the investigation is twofold. First, the article provides an overview of the content, intended effects, goals, and logics inherent to the action plan, via the analytical framework of governmentality developed by Mitchell Dean and Nikolas Rose (Dean 1999; Rose 1999). The purpose is to show how the prevention of radicalization in Denmark can be read partly as an extension of the repressive liberalism trend identified by Joppke. At the same time the perspective of governmentality provides a useful mold for debating the potential problems of targeting radicalization through a logic of governmentality and a commingling of security and integration concerns. Thus, the second part of the article examines whether the implementation of the action plan in practice may also yield iatrogenic effects. More precisely, the question investigated is if the neo-liberal intention of preventing radicalization by shaping and creating liberal-democratic citizens may be counter-productive, and in the worst-case scenario contribute to the creation of oppositional, illiberal identities? Here the article argues, building on extensive interview- and fieldwork-based research among young Muslims in Denmark, that at least three sets of unintended consequences may occur.

Providing a definitive answer to the question of outcomes of radicalization prevention policies of the kind being implemented in Denmark is beyond the scope of this article. Providing such an answer would mean conducting a policy-effect study, measuring the level or scope of radicalization among target groups before and after the implementation of policies, which would pose serious methodological challenges. Instead, this article takes a more indirect route of highlighting, first, the rationales behind the intended outcomes of Danish radicalization prevention policies and, second, theoretically and empirically possible mechanisms through which intended outcomes may be perverted in practice.


In January 2008 the Danish government set up a working group of ministry officials tasked with developing an action plan to prevent extremism and radicalization among young people. In January 2009, after a process of public consultation and dialogue on a draft version, the government’s *A Common and Safe Future* action plan was launched, to provide a multifaceted approach to radicalization prevention, pinpointing seven main areas of intervention with twenty-two concrete policy initiatives. The seven areas of intervention are: 1) direct contact with young people; 2) inclusion based on rights and obligations; 3) dialogue and information; 4) democratic cohesion; 5) efforts in vulnerable residential areas; 6) special initiatives in prisons; and 7) knowledge, cooperation, and partnerships.

In the following analysis the policy document is treated as the central plank of a developing “practice regime of radicalization prevention,” defined as the “more or less organized and routinized way in which we at a given time think, perform, and reform activities such as education, care, punishment, correction etc.” (Dean 1999, 30). The action plan constitutes the programmatic formulation of this new
practice regime, while the practice regime of radicalization prevention itself is made up of the concrete programs, policy measures, actors, and institutions that are involved in implementing the action plan.

Dean argues that the analysis of a practice regime can be divided into four analytical dimensions. First, an important aspect of any practice regime is the framing of the problem to be tackled, and the solutions that follow from this. The second analytical dimension concerns the way governance of behavior is thought to function, the more or less implicit logics connecting orchestrated impulses, and their effects, and the different rationales of regulation behind various concrete policy measures. The third dimension relates to the technical aspect of a practice regime, and deals with the programs, technologies, tactics, instruments, institutions, and procedures that are designed to implement the concrete policy measures of a practice regime. Finally, the goal of governmentality as a form of regulation, which is engraved in the operation of neo-liberal practice regimes, is the fertilization of certain favorable identities or subject positions. This analytical dimension examines the identity formation the practice regime seeks to foster and the capacities, behavior, and attitudes that are supposed to accompany this transformation. The analysis of the Danish government’s action plan to prevent radicalization follows the four-dimensional analytical grid outlined above.

1.1. Radicalization Scenarios: Problem Definition and Solutions

The overall goal of the Danish government’s action plan is formulated in the preface as a wish to:

maintain and further develop Denmark as a democratic society with freedom, responsibility, equality and opportunities for all. Primarily, because it holds an independent value for society as well as for the individual, but also in order to weaken the growth basis for radicalization of young people and to strengthen society’s resilience to extremism. (Regeringen 2009, 11)

It follows from this formulation that the problem of radicalization and extremism is perceived as negatively correlated with individual experiences of freedom, responsibility, equal worth, and equal opportunities, so that the absence of such positive experience provides a potential breeding ground for radicalization among young people. More precisely, the problem of radicalization and extremism is defined as follows:

Extremism is characterized by totalitarian and anti-democratic ideologies, intolerance to the views of others, hostile imagery and a division into ‘them’ and ‘us’. Extremist ideas may be expressed in different ways, and ultimately they may bring individuals or groups to use violent or undemocratic methods as a tool to reaching a specific political objective, or they may seek to undermine the democratic social order or make threats or carry out demeaning harassment against groups of people based on e.g. their skin colour, sexuality or beliefs.

Radicalization is the process in which a person gradually accepts the ideas and methods of extremism and, possibly, joins its organised groups. Personal circumstances, group dynamics as well as political, financial and cultural factors may all contribute to radicalization processes. (Regeringen, 2009, 8)

This two-fold definition of radicalization casts a certain light on the problem. First, it is worth noting that “extremism” is defined quite inclusively, making not only anti-democratic or violent actions, but also undemocratic and intolerant ideas and attitudes defining elements of an “extremist” profile. This tendency to define extremism, and subsequent radicalization, as both a cognitive/ideological and a physical phenomenon is common in academic literature and government reports on radicalization across Europe (for discussion hereof see Kühle and Lindekilde 2010, 24; Leuprect et al. 2010; Lambert 2011).

Secondly, radicalization is defined as the process of progressing internalization of extremist ideas. In this perspective radicalization becomes a more or less linear move away from a “normal” state of mind and action repertoire towards a “radical” outlook. In the academic literature on radicalization this processual perspective is dominant, often theorizing radicalization as following distinct phases (Silber and Bhatt 2007; Wiktorowicz 2005). Whether or not this processual understanding of radicalization is accurate is an empirical question. A growing literature suggests that it is not (Kühle and Lindekilde 2010; Olsen 2009; Staun 2009). However, what is important here is that this understanding of radicalization stipulates and replicates certain “radicalization scenarios” rather than others (Schiffauer 2008). In this perspective radicalization becomes likely when individuals are caught off balance, which can put them on a slippery slope from, for example, “moderate”
Islam to “radical” Islam. Much academic literature and press coverage on radicalization among young Muslims in the West subscribes to such a radicalization scenario, where individuals’ involvement in “Islamist” or “Salafist” milieus is seen as an early phase of radicalization, which serves as a “conveyor belt” into violent jihadism (Hemmingsen and Andreasen 2007). It is held that radical entrepreneurs within such neo-orthodox Muslim milieus are free to recruit for violence. It is obvious that subscribing to such a radicalization scenario leaves little room for seeing neo-orthodox, but non-violent, Muslim milieus as part of the solution rather than part of the problem.

Finally, as already indicated, the Danish government’s action plan defines radicalization as an individual phenomenon. It is individuals, not groups that radicalize. This means that responsibility for radicalization falls upon the individual. He or she has a responsibility to avoid radical milieus and to become a well-functioning, liberal member of society.

In terms of solutions it is clear that the above-mentioned understanding of the problem of radicalization as cognitive and behavioral, processual and individual, points in certain directions. First of all, the conceptualization of radicalization as a linear process or slippery slope calls for early preventive measures to stop such processes from gaining momentum. The particular understanding of radicalization advanced in the government action plan makes preventive measures a natural solution. The action plan justifies the preventive focus in the following manner:

Through a direct, preventive effort it must be ensured that we as a society are prepared to identify and address specific problems related to extremism in a timely manner. Extremist propaganda should be met with factual information and alternative offers for the young people. An early, multi-stringed and coordinated preventive effort should counter the processes and influences that make certain young people turn their backs on society or be recruited into radical and extremist groups. (Regeringen 2009, 11)

The logical response to radicalization processes is early intervention and prevention. Furthermore, it follows from the understanding of the problem of radicalization as an individual, and both cognitive and behavioral phenomenon, that prevention strategies should be targeted at individuals, and should include a concern for both individuals’ behavior and their attitudes and opinions.

My argument is that this problem definition and solution orientation makes the state-sponsored fight against radicalization and extremism very similar to the handling of other threats to individuals’ well-being, such as the fight against smoking and obesity. The approach to radicalization is also to attempt to reverse a negative development, to change behavior by influencing opinions and attitudes and offering alternative information and possibilities. Thus, the mode of regulation is one of neo-liberal governmentality, where the individuals’ free choice is made the locus of change and regulation. Put differently, I argue that one of the main reasons for the popularity of the radicalization discourse today is the ease with which it can be fused with the logic of the dominant mode of neo-liberal government in Western societies. Looking at the concrete policy measures of the action plan, this logic of prevention through influencing and correcting extremist attitudes, and the provision of more progressive alternatives to radical milieus, is highly visible (see next section). This is also underlined by the absence of prohibitions in the action plan; radicalization is to be fought through influencing and shaping individuals who make the “right” liberal-democratic choices on their own, rather than, for example, prohibiting extremist and radical groups. Security is advanced in society by facilitating integration and the development of liberal citizens, and not so much by the control, surveillance, and repression of the older anti-terrorism practice regime.

1.2. Concrete Measures and Logics of Change
The many concrete policy measures in the Danish action plan can be categorized into groups based on which rationale of governance and logic of change they adhere to. What all the categories of governance share is that they try to govern through the individuals’ management of freedom; where they differ is in terms of how directly they try to affect individual choices. Some build on direct involvement with adolescents, others try to obtain desired outcomes through indirect effects, for example by imposing new roles and responsibilities on street-level bureaucrats.
such as school teachers and social workers. I identity five rationales of governance in the action plan.

1.2.1. Governance through Individual Support and Response

The first group of initiatives builds on the idea that radicalization can be prevented if adolescents who show signs of “worrying behavior” are supported and challenged by other young people or adults who they respect and who hold more liberal-democratic values and identify more with mainstream society. The basic idea is that adolescents in the earliest phases of radicalization can be persuaded to change attitudes and behaviors in a more positive direction by interacting with others who hold different perspectives.

Two central policy measures in the Danish government action plan can be subsumed under this heading. First, we find the proposal of “Mentoring schemes focusing on young people and identity issues.” The mentoring schemes are currently under implementation in two model municipalities – Copenhagen and Aarhus – where corps of young mentors have been established and trained to make contact with adolescents in the target group, and understand radicalization processes and the meaning of identity building in such processes. The mentor-mentee relationship is voluntary, and no sanctions are applied if a potential mentee refuses to enter the program or leaves the program before completion. The mentors are thought of as a kind of task force, which can be called upon by street level bureaucrats who are in close contact with the young people (e.g., school teachers, youth workers, etc.), and who for various reasons are concerned about a particular individual. However, the actors behind the mentoring schemes (Ministry of Integration, local police, and municipality offices of integration) are still struggling to find out how to match mentors and mentees in a meaningful way, and how to make adolescents who are beginning to define themselves in opposition to mainstream society engage in a relationship with mentors who to some extent represent the society and system they are opposing.

The second, and similar, example of a policy measure that builds on a rationale of governance through individual support and response is the attempt to implement radicalization as a “new parameter of concern” within the existing context of “School – Social services – Police” (SSP) collaboration. This institutionalized collaboration has traditionally been concerned with crime prevention and alcohol/drug abuse. The concrete initiative is designed to train school teachers to identify signs of radicalization, understand radicalization processes, and initiate early intervention either by holding a meeting with the specific student and his/her teachers and family, or by contacting the authorities, for example through the mentoring program. However, the initiative has met some initial resistance among some school teachers who did not believe it to be their task to “spot potential terrorists” (Kühle and Lindeklide 2010). Likewise, they believe that there are important differences between worrying about youth delinquency and radicalization, with the latter treated as a problem with more political undertones.

1.2.2. Governance through Information and Knowledge

A different set of initiatives aims at providing adolescents with information and knowledge about radicalization, democracy, and citizenship. The rationale is that information about possibilities of democratic inclusion and active citizenship will prepare adolescents to make the “right” choices regarding identity formation and channeling of frustrations. The assumption seems to be that if the supply of information targeting young people is optimized and made “factual,” attitudes and behaviors can be changed. A range of initiatives fall in this category, including the creation of an “internet forum for young people on democracy and radicalization”; “inspirational material on democracy and civic education in Danish public schools”; “lessons in democracy and civic citizenship in the independent primary schools”; “increased dialogue and information on the Danish foreign policy”; “strengthened training in democracy and civic citizenship in the Danish Language Education for adult foreigners” (Regeringen 2009). It is obvious that several of these initiatives are de-
signed to target information flows involving, particularly, young Muslims in Danish society. It is also clear from the descriptions of the initiatives that the information flow will mostly be one-way – from authorities to radicalization-threatened adolescents. Thus, rather than a two-way exchange of views, most initiatives in this category build on monological attempts to persuade and change perceptions in the target group.

One particular initiative in this category has fostered intense public debate, namely the initiative to carry out extra inspection visits to twenty-five selected independent primary schools to ensure that they live up to their responsibility to prepare the students for living in a society with freedom and democracy. The controversy concerns both the selection of schools and the actual visits. So far ten inspection visits have been carried out. It has been pointed out, especially by the Association of Danish Independent Schools, that the formulated selection criteria seem quite arbitrary. Of the ten schools selected so far half had predominantly Muslim students and were based in residential areas with a high percentage of foreigners and citizens with a Muslim background. Considering that Muslim independent schools make up only about 5 percent of all Danish independent schools, the Association of Danish Independent Schools and others argue that the inspections were designed from the outset to check Muslim independent schools, and that this is highly discriminatory. A headmaster from a Catholic school that was also selected for investigation argued against this background that his school served as an “alibi” in the authorities’ crackdown on Muslim schools (Kjærgaard and Larsen 2010).

1.2.3. Governance through Empowerment
A third set of initiatives in the action plan aims to empower target groups to solve their own problems by enhancing competences and abilities. A central concern is to boost “democratic competences” as a way to make adolescents abstain from choosing radical identities and milieus. The basic idea seems to be that by helping target groups become aware of possibilities of citizenship and democratic engagement, the breeding ground of radicalization will be reduced and target groups better equipped to solve problems of radicalization.

Concretely, the action plan seeks to enhance “democratic competences” by funding special “associational mentors” who can further the creation of cultural, sports, and leisure associations building on democratic principles among adolescents with multicultural backgrounds. Another example is funding and creation of “citizenship centers” aiming to “strengthen young people’s development of identity, sense of belonging, responsibility, civic citizenship and democratic competencies” (Regeringen 2009, 19–20) by providing information and guidance on “active citizenship”. A final example concerns the initiative to create a “democratic platform for young people,” especially those with a multicultural background. The idea is that adolescents from immigrant communities who are engaged in associations or networks that take part in democracy and intercultural activities can help empower young people with multicultural backgrounds who feel excluded from the democratic community.

1.2.4. Governance through Surveillance and Intervention
Despite the dominance of neo-liberal logics of governance in the Danish action plan to prevent radicalization, a few initiatives seem to be based on more conventional modes of regulation through control, surveillance, and intervention.

This is the case for some of the initiatives targeting “vulnerable residential areas” (Regeringen 2009, 22) and the prison system. In vulnerable residential areas, for example, the government action plan intervenes in local housing associations’ letting practices by pushing for more mixed letting in these areas, giving priority to “resourceful tenants” over “long-term recipients of cash benefits, start-up assistance or introduction benefits” (Regeringen 2009, 23). In the prison system the action plan to prevent radicalization forces prisons to adopt a new approval scheme for prison chaplains, designed to ensure that approved chaplains are fully aware of their responsibility to help prevent radicalization.

However, the most significant initiative under this heading is the increased use of “preventive talks” conducted by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service with adolescents who have shown signs of early radicalization or are affiliated with extremist milieus. The use of preventive talks
builds on a logic of internalization of surveillance by making people aware that they are being watched. The Danish Security and Intelligence Service is currently designing a concept for these preventive talks and methods to screen out individuals in the early stages of radicalization.

1.2.5. Governance through Anti-Discrimination

Of the twenty-two initiatives in the action plan, twenty-one are covered by the above-mentioned four rationales of governance. The last strategy, of governance through anti-discrimination, comprises only one initiative and is rather an outlier in the action plan. The initiative is rather undeveloped and stipulates only a need to provide better information on how to achieve justice after suffering discrimination, strengthened activities against discrimination in nightlife, and anti-discrimination measures addressing the unfair allocation of vocational traineeships. Given that experiences of discrimination are cited as a potential cause of radicalization in the Danish government action plan, this shows that discrimination is targeted in order to indirectly prevent radicalization. Thus, anti-discrimination is not only pursued as a good in its own right.

As already indicated, the practice regime of radicalization prevention can be seen as situated between a practice regime of security and one of integration, tolerance, and citizenship. The influence of and connection with the practice regime of integration, tolerance, and citizenship are particularly clear in connection with the initiatives on anti-discrimination. The particular initiative of anti-discrimination clearly originates there. Following Joppke we can say that this particular initiative draws on a more Rawlsian notion of liberalism, which is more accepting and accommodating of cultural difference than the disciplining and correcting notion of Foucauldian liberalism, which is dominant in the Danish action plan.

1.3. Implementation – Theory and Practice

The Danish action plan to prevent radicalization is currently being implemented. A state-sponsored status report on the progress of implementation concludes (in October 2010) that “most initiatives have been launched, and a few already finalized” (Cowi 2010, 4). However, several initiatives are still only words on paper, including a number designed to advance feelings of inclusion in the democratic community among ethnic minorities. The largest progress has been made with the initiatives targeting specific individuals in the earliest stages of a radicalization process.

If we turn to the concrete instruments, techniques, procedures, and institutions that are to implement the government action plan in practice, two observations are worth mentioning. The first point to note is the variety of instruments and techniques brought into play, spanning informational campaigning, education of street-level bureaucrats, production of handbooks, support of associative activities, mentoring programs, role models, school inspections, etc. The actors involved in the implementation process include school teachers, local police, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service, parents, municipalities, young people with a multicultural background, social workers, youth club employees, etc. It is clear that this very broad coalition-building calls for intense collaboration, division of labor, and adjustment of criteria of success (Lindekilde and Fahmi 2011). It is far from obvious that all these different actors share the understanding of the problem and solutions envisioned in the government action plan – a point which is further developed below.

Second, implementation of many of the initiatives in the action plan is connected to existing instruments and institutions known and used in other practice regimes. For example, the aforementioned extra inspection visits to selected independent schools are linked to the inspection and control obligations that the Ministry of Education already has vis-à-vis Danish independent schools according to the Independent Schools Act. Likewise, within the existing School/Social services/Police framework radicalization is implemented as a new “parameter of concern” alongside existing ones of alcohol/drug abuse, criminality, suicidal tendencies, eating disorders, etc. This importing or re-embedding of existing technologies of governance is also clearly present in the mentor corps and role model schemes, which have been widely used in other Danish practice regimes, not least in the field of integration.

This “reinvention” of instruments and techniques builds on a logic of cost minimization and regulation efficiency
maximization. As many of the techniques and institutional frameworks have proven effective in other areas of governance, the basic assumption is that they will be easy to reuse and effective in the field of radicalization. However, from a governmentality perspective one would also assume that the particular area of governance – and its understanding of problem and solution – will affect the efficiency of techniques. Thus, one can ask what happens to existing instruments when they are either imported to a new practice regime or loaded with new objectives. For example, how can a role model scheme be meaningfully imported into the field of radicalization prevention? Or what happens to the understanding of intentions when standard anti-discrimination measures are presented in the context of radicalization prevention? These questions are addressed in section two below.

1.4. Identities and Subject Positions
The last dimension of the policy analysis takes a closer look at how the action plan creates certain favorable identities and how identity formation is directed. We can say that where the three first dimensions of the analysis are concerned primarily with the means of governance in the area of radicalization prevention, this last dimension is concerned with the end goal of governance: forming the “right” kind of people.

A particular concept of the “ideal citizen” permeates the action plan. This identity can be summarized as the responsible, liberal citizen, who is perceived as the natural starting point for identity formation in liberal societies. Radicalization is, from this perspective, the move away from this natural starting point towards alternative (negative) identities. The ideal citizen of the action plan is first and foremost pro-democratic and non-violent, and non-supportive/non-sympathetic vis-à-vis violent or undemocratic groups. In addition, the ideal citizen is responsible and active. In several parts of the action plan active citizenship, in terms of participation in associational life and democratic procedures, is praised as an important aspect of citizenship. Becoming such an active citizen who contributes to the common good is framed in the action plan as an individual responsibility. Thus, ideal citizens not only oppose violent and undemocratic methods, they also play an active and responsible part in society. Finally, the action plan stipulates workforce integration as essential to the identity of a responsible, liberal citizen. This ideal identity created in the action plan has much in common with the kind of liberal citizens that Joppke identifies as the end goal of civic integration policies in Europe.

In opposition to this ideal citizen, the action plan situates “the radical,” “the extremist,” or the adolescent “threatened by radicalization.” This individual has undergone, or is undergoing, a process which destroys the normal, natural and liberal starting point of identity formation. In this perspective the move away from the liberal ideal identity is due to the individual’s lack of necessary resources, abilities, and competences to seize the opportunities offered by liberal-democratic society. The empowerment logic described above underlines this understanding of identity formation. In many ways the “radical” is characterized by the negation of traits of the responsible, liberal citizen, for example by being violent, undemocratic, and inactive. The action plan makes several links between living in “parallel societies,” isolation from mainstream society, and this negative identity.

The action plan to prevent radicalization is, in short, all about formation of responsible, liberal citizens at the expense of “radical” identities, and the two fundamental subject positions are understood in terms of either-or. Either you take on the liberal identity, or you take on a radical identity and become the target of corrective policies of intervention. This perception leaves little room for, for example, verbally supporting violent groups like Hamas or al-Shabaab and at the same time being a responsible, liberal citizen.

2. Potential Iatrogenic Effects of Radicalization Prevention Policies?
After highlighting the intended consequences and the underlying rationale and logics of change within the developing practice regime of radicalization prevention in Denmark, we now turn to a theoretical and empirical discussion of potential perversion of intentions and consequences when moving from policy formulations to policy delivery vis-à-vis target groups (Boudon 1982). It is a fair assumption, based on the vast literature of policy studies
(for example Hogwood and Lewis 1993), that the consequences of radicalization prevention in practice will depend partly on its implementation – the way policies are put to work and presented to citizens by “street level bureaucrats” (Lipsky 1980). Likewise, the efficiency of any policy depends partly on the target group’s perception of the policy’s legitimacy/illegitimacy (Winter and Lehman Nielsen 2008). This section addresses Muslims’ perceptions and evaluations of radicalization prevention policies: How are the problem definition and solution strategy suggested by the practice regime of radicalization prevention evaluated by target group members? How is the neo-liberal strategy of disciplining into liberal-democratic citizens perceived in practice? How are policy intentions behind specific initiatives of radicalization prevention understood and decoded? The question whether there is any theoretical and empirical evidence that radicalization prevention policies might have iatrogenic effects in practice is of specific interest.

The aforementioned empirical research among young neo-orthodox Muslims in the city of Aarhus, Denmark, forms the basis of the discussion. The study at large empirically investigated the usefulness of the terminology of radicalization in identifying and combating potential risks. The study applied the definition provided by the Danish government in its action plan to prevent and radicalization, and compared it with the political and religious beliefs, perceptions, and distinctions articulated in the concrete Muslim milieu. The study sought, by comparing the majority “etic” categories of the radicalization discourse (representing the cultural understandings of the professional policymaking and academic outsiders) with the “emic” categories (representing the cultural understandings of the target groups), to clarify the boundaries of radicalization and define the term more precisely. In addition, the study examined how young Muslims in the target group of the radicalization prevention policies evaluated the new action plan. Such evaluations were discussed in depth in seventeen interviews with Muslims in the study. This part of the study soon showed that the vast majority of our interviewees were surprisingly well informed about the policy initiatives and quite critical of their design and potential effects (negative evaluations were expressed in fifteen of the seventeen interviews). To be fair, a few interviewees were broadly positive towards the government action plan, and thought it was a necessary move. In particular, the ideas of improving anti-discrimination efforts were applauded. Another group of interviewees approved of the radicalization prevention plans, but believed they would have minimal effect, if any at all. One said “this is fine, but it is like curing cancer with Aspirins” (Muhammad, Somali, age 19). In the following, interview statements that suggested more negative perceptions and effects of the policies are analyzed and linked with relevant theoretical perspectives. I choose to focus on these negative evaluations as they were by far the most frequent in our interviews and because they are the most worrisome from a societal or policy-making perspective. The nine different Muslim interviewees quoted in the following are all men from immigrant backgrounds (although eight Muslim women were interviewed for the larger study), with ages ranging from nineteen to thirty-eight, and different educational backgrounds. Most were students of some kind, but the sample also included private and public sector employees and unemployed individuals.

2.1. Policy-learning, Labeling and Suspect Communities

The first theoretical perspective I will apply to the empirical material is a tradition in policy studies that is concerned with the self-image that specific target groups “learn” from the framing of certain problems and the labeling of groups in policy texts and implementation practices (Soss 1999; Schneider and Ingram 1993). Framing and labeling – in this case the label “radical Muslim” – constructs a particular understanding of the problem that legitimizes policy initiatives (see above). Studies in this tradition show how affected target groups can react to imposed labels that are perceived as stigmatizing, either by opposing them or by gradually subscribing to them (Moncrieffe 2007). The effect in terms of behavior is that policies do not have the intended consequences.

One particular way that policy framing and labels can lead to stigmatization and iatrogenic effects is by obscuring the diversity of interpretations and divisions that may be critical for addressing the very problem or cases that the label highlights (Balchlin 2007). In our interviews this was a
common criticism of the way the term “radical Muslim” is defined and addressed in the Danish government’s action plan. Two quotes exemplify this reasoning and the potential effects:

The effect is that you become tired. When you generalize things many who are unaffected become affected. It is a very degrading feeling. The result is that some begin to isolate themselves more – to go against this. (Jamaal, Palestinian, age 28)

The problem lies in the foundation of society, in the basic structures, in the lack of understanding of Muslim culture. There is a need for much more widespread understanding of the fact that there is no necessary link between being a practicing Muslim, even an orthodox Muslim, and radicalization. It is just not that simple. We need much more nuances. But when you see the other as an enemy there is no room for nuances. One can come up with as many initiatives to combat radicalization as one likes, but as long as this basic fact is not understood their effect will be minimal. And this will take time” (Taamir, imam, age 32)

The two quotes touch upon how the label “radical Muslim,” as defined in government policy, is believed to be too broad and inclusive, and incapable of drawing necessary distinctions. More precisely, the widespread perception was that by making support of “terrorist organization” like Hamas and al-Shabaab, and undemocratic opinions or practices (such as unwillingness to participate in democratic elections) part of the definition of “radicalization,” the Danish government is de facto labeling large parts of the Danish Muslim population as “radicals.” Further, it was argued that such support and opinions represented the exercise of constitutionally protected free speech and freedom of religion, and did not pose any danger to Danish society in terms of violence.

The effect of the perceived gross generalization implied by the label “radical Muslim” is that it casts suspicion on all Muslims:

If I was somebody who did not often meet Muslims I might see these initiatives as a sign that we need to keep an eye on all Muslims … We are creating a disproportionate surveillance society. It will create distance and then we have a problem. I don’t think any parallel societies exist today in Denmark, but this would mean that they would develop. I would not trust anybody from the authorities. If my seven-year-old daughter starts wearing the headscarf, am I then a potential radical who needs to be kept under surveillance? (Naadir, Pakistani, age 24)

If the general Danish population does not calm down concerning coexistence with ethnic groups, with Muslims, and stop focusing on them as a potential threat and constantly being on guard with suspicion and exaggerations, then the radicalization prevention plan will fail. The action plan itself talks about the importance of demystification and communication, acceptance and inclusion, but where are we to find the ingredients, if not among ordinary Danes. (Taamir, imam, age 32)

In line with recent studies on the effects of “hard” counter-terrorism efforts in Western Europe (Schiffauer 2008, Mythen, Walklate and Khaan 2009; Pantazis and Pemberton 2009), the data from our study suggests that the labeling and framing of “soft” radicalization prevention policies are creating feelings among Muslims of being treated as a “suspect community.” The quotes demonstrate how such generalized suspicion from the surrounding society may lead Muslims to react with isolation and suspicion of majority authorities. On the level of everyday life Gabe Mythen and his collaborators show how the creation of Muslims as a “suspect community” has very real effects, making young British Muslims “perform safety” in public places for example by not carrying backpacks in the London underground (Mythen, Walklate and Khan 2009, 747).

The power of labeling seems real in many ways. Another common effect of policy framing and labeling is that it directs the focus toward particular problems and solutions, to the exclusion of others that may be equally salient. Thus, the entire practice regime of radicalization prevention, along with the intense public debate about radical Islam, works to connect the Muslim community to the phenomenon of radicalization. As shown in the policy analysis in the previous section, this focus means that other problems of lacking integration, socio-economic ghettoization, and discrimination are subsumed under the heading of radicalization prevention. Two quotes illustrate the problematic nature of this simultaneous highlighting and overshadowing of issues:

I think this extreme focus on radicalization will fail and at some point the authorities will do their own evaluations and see that these initiatives had very little effect, if any. They will realize that they are still left with a lot of other and more pressing issues and problems that have not been solved because of the focus on radicalization. (Umar, Somali, age 28)
All these soft measures in the government action plan are fine, if only they had not appeared in an action plan to combat radicalization. There is a need for more focus on democratic values, a need for more dialogue and knowledge. But when it comes in this context I think it is problematic. (Naadir, Pakistani, age 24)

The last quote points to an interesting dilemma that surfaced again and again in our interviews: Muslims in the target group generally accept the liberal ambition of pushing certain democratic values, active citizenship, dialogue, anti-discrimination, socio-economic integration, etc., but resist the idea of pushing these issues under the heading of preventing radicalization. The general perception was that these issues deserved attention in their own right and not merely as components of the radicalization problem. Our interviewees found that the good intentions behind the move to address these issues were clouded by way the issues were framed and addressed only as causal factors of radicalization.

2.2. Misrecognition and Muslim Identity Strategies

It has already been hinted that the framing and labeling inherent in the Danish radicalization prevention policy are perceived as degrading, discriminatory, and stigmatizing by the young Muslims in our study. These findings can be explored further by linking them to theories of recognition. Stigmatization is a form of misrecognition, which theories of recognition, as formulated by Charles Taylor and Axal Honneth (Taylor 1994; Honneth 2006), would predict had consequences in terms of identity building. The starting point for these theoretical perspectives is that recognition in modern societies is something that is created and negotiated socially, and no longer something that flows automatically from one’s position in social hierarchies. Thus, recognition of identity as individually and collectively valuable can be denied by the surrounding society. This can be problematic as recognition is perceived to be a necessary condition for being oneself, for personal integrity, and for possibilities of achieving the good life. According to Taylor, recognition is “not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need” (1994, 26). Axel Honneth argues that recognition is negotiated in three different spheres – the private sphere of relations to family and friends; the legal sphere that concerns the individual’s juridical rights and duties; and the sphere of solidarity, which pertains to the collectives the individual belongs to (e.g. political, ethnic, or religious) (2006, 93). Recognition in the sphere of solidarity, which is the most relevant here, is conditional on an evaluation of particular groups or identities as contributing to the common good of society. Thus, to realize one’s full potential and become a valued citizen in a pluralistic society it is not enough to gain respect within one’s own group or minority; it takes recognition from society at large (Anderson 2005: xvii). Taylor describes the consequences of misrecognition of identities by society:

Our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being. (1994, 25)

Experiences of misrecognition in the sphere of solidarity, for example communicated through stigmatizing labeling in public policies, can lead individuals into identity crisis. Honneth underlines how the loss of dignity and self-respect can only be rectified through action, for example through protest, continuing the fight for recognition, or searching for recognition in alternative collectives (2006, 181). Honneth, thus, implies that there is a connection between political resistance/protest, including radical political opposition, and experiences of misrecognition.

Such a link between perceived misrecognition in the general framing and labeling of Muslims in the Danish action plan and different identity strategies was often indicated in our interviews. One interviewee said:

The young become tired of this generalized depiction of them – in policies and in the media. Through my work I experience first hand how many choose to go abroad to look for work because they cannot stand hearing it anymore. This has gone on for years now, and the debate about radicalization is just adding another layer. . . . The focus is always on the very few that have a problem with democracy, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. The focus is entirely on all negative. And the broader group of Muslims pays the price. All those young people with a Muslim background who are involved in the education system are good and sensible young people. What does radicalization have to do with them? They become very tired of it all. (Majid, consultant, age 38)
Here the reaction to misrecognizing generalizations is one of exit from majority society, and simply looking abroad for better life chances and recognition. Faced with misrecognition from Danish society, young Muslims of immigrant descent are giving up “Danish Muslim” identities and looking to find respect, for example, in Muslim majority countries abroad.

Another response strategy would be to downplay the elements of identity that are being misrecognized, here Islam, for example by avoiding visual markers of religion, and assimilating into “Western culture” and norms of privatizing religion. This strategy can be found among segments of the Danish Muslim population who identify as “cultural Muslims.” However, to our interviewees, who were very orthodox, Salafi-inspired Muslims, this option seemed untenable. On the contrary, several interviewees suggested that experiences of misrecognition lead young Muslims to strengthen their Muslim identity:

What happens when young Muslims are confronted with this is that they are confirmed in the feeling that they are a problem – that they are under suspicion. This confrontation means that they become even more aware of their Muslim identity, as they feel stepped upon. This can be the seed for a negative reaction among some, a rollback of understanding. (Taamir, imam, age 32)

Rather than leading to exit or assimilation, in this context misrecognition is held to produce demonstrative voicing and display of difference. The idea expressed in the quote, that misrecognition and assimilation pressure may have unintended consequences among young Muslims in the West struggling to balance between two (or more) cultures, has been identified in other studies as well (for example Mythen, Walklate and Khan 2009; Schiffauer 2007; Roy 2007). In fact, it has been suggested that such experiences of misrecognition have fed into the re-Islamification of young Muslims across Europe over the last decade.

A final reactionary strategy implies not just a demonstrative display of difference, but the creation of actual oppositional identities, where young Muslims come together to define themselves in opposition to majority society. They construct an identity around the very misrecognition of the society that misrecognizes them. This identity strategy is obviously the most worrying from a perspective of radicalization prevention, as the theory suggests that this kind of oppositional identity building on a division of the world into “us” and “them” forms part of the breeding ground for radicalization. Commenting upon the initiative in the Danish action plan to make school teachers and social workers more aware of the signs of radicalization, one interviewee states:

Imagine a social worker who has no knowledge of a person’s background, and very little knowledge about what it is to be a Muslim, who is then told to evaluate whether a person or a family shows signs of radicalization. I cannot in my wildest dreams imagine how a few courses will enable such a person to make this evaluation. I cannot see how such a situation where they are told to evaluate people’s thoughts, opinions, dress, and reactions can lead to anything good. The effect will be negative, there will be a counter-reaction. Already a lot of Muslims believe that the authorities operate on the basis of stereotypes and prejudice. Trust is already low. (Jamaal, Palestinian, age 28)

The quote implies that implementation of this initiative could have iatrogenic effects by further reducing Muslim trust in authorities and in the worst case scenario lead young Muslims to isolate from majority society and actively discredit authorities.

If we look at our interviewees’ evaluations of the different types of neo-liberal governance in the Danish radicalization action plan an interesting pattern appears. As already indicated, most interviewees are positive towards “governance through anti-discrimination,” although several would prefer the government to have addressed the problem outside of the practice regime of radicalization prevention. Likewise, most interviewees are mildly positive or indifferent towards “governance through empowerment,” as they welcome efforts to foster and strengthen cultural/religious dialogue and organization-building. Interestingly, several interviewees explicitly expressed positive evaluations of “governance through surveillance and interference,” specifically the increased use of “preventive talks” by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service. As long as such preventive talks are conducted in the light of a concrete suspicion of terrorist activities, the interviewees welcomed it as a necessary instrument. One said:
I have met several young people where I think such a talk would have had a positive effect. However, the effect depends on who is doing the talk – it should not be the frightened social worker, but the police. And it is essential that this does not become a slippery slope where everybody who takes their shoes off to go into the mosque needs a preventive talk. For this to work we have to be very careful with the techniques that are used and the kind of presumptions that we bring to such talks. (Kareem, age 22)

However, the vast majority of young Muslims in our study protested against the “governance through individual support and response” initiatives, in particular the role model/mentoring schemes and the idea of making radicalization a new parameter of concern in the existing preventive School/Social services/Policelcollaboration. Commenting on the role model campaigns, one interviewee said:

I am so tired of role model campaigns. It has become a religion, you see. And some people have made a fortune from these role models. What this obsession with role model campaigns says is: “There are few role models among Muslims in Denmark, but large criminal networks.” That is not true – this is not what the real picture looks like. It is very discriminatory. (Racheed, age 27)

The implicit message of role model campaigns is seen as discriminatory against the target groups, as it suggests that these groups (i.e. young Muslims) are in particular need of role models. It is thus perceived as communicating misrecognition. Another interviewee argues:

The idea behind the mentor campaigns and role models is that if we make some immigrants have contact to some Danes, the immigrants cannot help but become a little bit more Danish, that is, a little bit better. I am not sure that this is the way to solve our problems. (Umar, Somali, age 28)

This quote can be read as a critique of the subtle form of neo-liberal governmentality – the disciplining and shaping of attitudes and behaviors – which quite obviously forms the rationale behind this initiative. The interviewee problematizes the underlying assumption that if young people from the target group interact with others who are more in contact with mainstream society and liberal-democratic values, the radicalization-prone adolescents will alter their exercise of freedom in a more productive direction. Likewise, the logic behind “governance through information and knowledge” is criticized for being “propagandistic,” and a one-sided attempt to persuade and change perceptions in the target group. One interviewee argues that these initiatives are designed to “stuff liberal values down our throats” (Muhammad, age 25). The general point here is that the good intentions behind these preventive measures are perceived as misrecognition, which may have iatrogenic effects on Muslim identity-building.

2.3. The Fear of the Label “Radical” – Participating as a Muslim in Public Debates and Preventive Collaborations

In January 2011 the Danish branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir held a much-debated public meeting in Copenhagen. In a press interview the spokesman of the largest Muslim umbrella organization in Denmark, Zubair Butt Hussain, said that he would like to go to the meeting just to hear what these “loonies” had to say, but that he dared not go as he feared the argumentative strategy of “guilt by association” that is so common in public debates about Islam in Denmark. Put differently, Zubair But Hussain feared that he would be labeled “radical” just for showing up at the meeting and would, as he put it, “spend the rest of his life trying to distance himself from stoning and violent jihad” (Omar, February 28, 2011).

This example illustrates the final iatrogenic mechanism of the radicalization prevention policies and the radicalization discourse in general, and shows that the label “radical” is a powerful tool for excommunicating actors in public debates. Assigning the label to Muslims active in public discourse discredits them and puts them on the defensive, forcing them to answer all kinds of questions about their beliefs and values. In fact, it can be argued that Muslim actors who want to be part of public debate are increasingly expected to proactively endorse certain liberal democratic values (such as rule of law, freedom of speech, gender equality, etc.) and reject others (such as sharia, support of violent groups, jihad, etc.) before ever saying anything in public. That is, the entry barriers for Muslims in public debate seem to be growing. As one interviewee said:

It has become more difficult to engage in the public debate on integration, and now radicalization. One has to sound perfectly in tune in order to be accepted. You need to have the right views. Many just don’t dare to speak up anymore as they are scared of the label “radical.” … I never had hesitated to speak up in the media, but now I consider it a million times … The situation to-
day is that all the progressive voices are silent in the public debate. They have left the floor to voices such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. (Naadir, Pakistani, age 24)

One consequence of the requirement to endorse and reject certain values in order to be a legitimate Muslim voice in public debate, and not be excommunicated as “radical,” is that it leaves the floor to those who are in fact radicals and therefore have nothing to lose by being identified as such. The problem with this development is that radical views are left unquestioned as alternative voices withdraw from public debates:

No one dares to speak their mind. They don’t have the resources to confront the wave of criticism that follows. And maybe they give up and isolate themselves. This is very crucial. It worries me that these voices become silent because it leaves more room for radical views, which are not questioned. (Majid, consultant, age 38)

The alternative voices alluded to here are those who try to balance religious orthodoxy and skepticism of Western culture and institutions with a clear opposition to violence and confrontation. Many interviewees believe these actors would constitute an effective alternative to radical groups:

People need to understand that Muslim representatives in public debates have to balance on a knife-edge. Danish Muslims have many more realities and concerns than the ordinary Dane. They care about foreign politics, problems in their home countries. Many are critical towards the U.S. As a representative you cannot just ignore this. You lose legitimacy. If Muslim representatives are to play a role in the fight against radicalization they cannot do so on premises laid out by the government or the press. It is a balance, and these people need room to argue their case in their own language without being called radicals. (Taamir, imam, age 32)

The last part of this quote addresses an important point. The radicalization discourse has spread the fear of the label “radical,” leading Muslim actors who could prove important allies in the battle against radicalization to withdraw from public debates. These actors may pose a challenge in terms of integration, as they do not fit the mold of the liberal democratic citizen, but not in terms of security. Such Muslim actors, be they local imams, community leaders, or influential sheiks, may very well be the best suited to reach young Muslims flirting with violent jihadism. But, as indicated by the quote above, they would lose their legitimacy if they first had to comply with the premises of the radicalization discourse by confirming democratic ideals and dismissing principles of sharia. So if the authorities were to make use of such actors in the battle against radicalization it would mean overlooking intolerant and non-integrationist perspectives for the sake of addressing security concerns. So far the Danish authorities have been very reluctant to do this.

To sum up, the practice regime of radicalization prevention and the radicalization discourse in general are narrowing the room for non-integrationist, but non-confrontational, orthodox Muslims to participate in public debates or cooperate with the authorities. And this may have iatrogenic effects in terms of refuting jihadist rhetoric and reaching to those few adolescents who are flirting with violent means. Insisting on dialogue only with those who share “our” fundamental values and goals could turn out to be counterproductive.

3. Conclusions
The first part of this paper provided a governmentality analysis of the Danish action plan to prevent radicalization. It investigated the framing of the problem of radicalization, the modes of governance suggested as the solutions to the problem, the techniques and institutions of implementation as well as the positive/negative subject positions and labels inherent in policies. It was argued that the developing practice regime of radicalization prevention revolves around logics of “repressive liberalism,” which holds that radical identities can be prevented by shaping and disciplining adolescents with illiberal and undemocratic beliefs into liberal democratic citizens. The basic mode of governance here is one of influencing individuals’ exercise of free will, not through control and prohibitions but through incentives, information, empowerment, and challenging interventions. The analysis showed how the problem of radicalization is framed as an individual, gradual, and both behavioral and cognitive process, which justifies a diverse and multifaceted approach to radicalization prevention, aiming at early, individual intervention and changing behavior by altering illiberal attitudes, beliefs, and values.

The second part of the paper discussed how this policy framing, labeling, and mode of governance was received
and evaluated by Muslims in the target group. The main question addressed here was whether the neo-liberal intentions of radicalization prevention in the government action plan are perverted in the process of practical implementation. This question was addressed by analyzing data from a large interview-based study of young, orthodox Muslims in Denmark, in combination with insights from relevant theoretical perspectives. The analysis showed, first, how the label “radical Muslim” in the preventive policies was perceived as glossing over important lines of division within the Muslim target group, thus grouping together Muslims who support groups such as Hamas and al-Shabaab because they believe they are fighting a legitimate battle in war-like situations, with the very few who would support al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism in the West. Likewise, the label was perceived as wrongly grouping Muslims who would not vote in democratic elections for religious reasons with the very few Muslims in the West who actively work to undermine democracy. These generalizations inherent in the definition of the label “radical Muslim” were found to contribute to the experience that Muslims in general are made into part of a “suspect community.” Secondly, the analysis showed how the general framing and labeling of the practice regime of radicalization prevention together with concrete initiatives in the action plan were evaluated as communicating misrecognition of Muslims and Islam. The data suggests here that experiences of misrecognition may negatively affect Muslim identity strategies, ultimately by fostering oppositional Muslim identities. Finally, analysis of the empirical data suggested that the spread of the radicalization discourse in Denmark has created a fear among Muslim actors of the label “radical,” which is used in public debates to effectively excommunicate Muslim actors who are not perfectly in tune with the majority’s liberal democratic ideas. It was shown how this mechanism has shrunk the latitude in public debate and the scope of institutionalized cooperation with the authorities for non-integrationist but non-confrontational orthodox Muslim actors.

Although the analysis of iatrogenic effects of radicalization prevention policies described in this paper is indicative rather than strictly causal, I find the evidence worrying. Although the evidence does not suggest that young Muslims addressed by a radicalization mentor or critical questions from teachers will automatically radicalize further as a consequence of negative labels and experiences of misrecognition, it does suggest that this risk is real, and that confrontation with the radicalization discourse could have unintended negative effects through more indirect channels. The data presented here indicates that the risks of iatrogenic effects of radicalization prevention are greatest in initiatives that are heavily influenced by the logic of “repressive liberalism.” The existence of these risks does not mean that we should give up trying to prevent radicalization, but it most certainly should make us think very carefully about how to frame, formulate, present, and practically implement radicalization prevention policies.
References


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